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NEW SEC INTERPRETATIONS AND TREASURY 
REGULATIONS AIMED AT CURBING THE INVERSION 
EPIDEMIC WILL NOT LIKELY HAVE MATERIAL EFFECTS 
ON FUTURE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS  
Over the past few years, political officials, including President 
Barack Obama, have deemed corporate inversions unpatriotic and thrust 
them into the spotlight.1 Inversions occur when a U.S. corporation merg-
es with or acquires a foreign corporation and reorganizes into that coun-
try, or a third-party country, if applicable. The Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion has projected that over the next ten years, the U.S. Treasury will lose 
$41 billion because of this tax minimization tactic.2 While inversions are 
primarily tax driven, the SEC and the Treasury are attempting to curb 
them by implementing targeted interpretations and regulations, essential-
ly duct-taping an issue that demands a strong overhaul of the federal cor-
porate tax code.  
The recent interpretation of Rule 14a-4(a)(3) by the SEC and the 
new regulations by the Treasury department will provide increased 
transparency in inversion transactions and reduce the number of situa-
tions where inversions are allowed, but because of the ever existent tax 
benefits of inversion, they likely will not have a material effect on the 
majority of future inversion transactions.  
This article will first provide some background on corporate inver-
sions, then lead to an analysis of the new SEC interpretation of Rule 14a-
4(a)(3) and an explanation of how that interpretation does not provide 
any material changes to inversions. Next, the article will explain and 
analyze the five sets of Treasury regulations and examine why each of 
those sets of regulations, while narrowing the potential field of targets 
and making it harder for inversions to occur, is not the answer to the 
problem. Lastly, I will propose some solutions to the problem. Through-
out this article, it is helpful to keep in mind that inversions do not occur 
because directors want changes in corporate governance or that they have 
a strong desire to merge with the foreign entity, but instead because of 
the extensive tax savings of inverting. 
  
 1. Mike Patton, Will Tax Inversions Sink the U.S. Economy?, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2014, 5:53 
PM),  
 http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2014/08/12/will-tax-inversions-sink-the-u-s-economy/. 
 2. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., MEMORANDUM: REVENUE ESTIMATE 
REQUEST 3 (Comm. Print 2015),  
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/document
s/JCT%20Score%20July%202015.pdf. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Before delving into the complexities of the recent SEC interpreta-
tion and Treasury regulations, it is important to have some background 
on corporate inversions, including their structure, purpose, and side ef-
fects. As stated at the outset, inversions occur when a U.S. corporation 
merges with or acquires a foreign corporation and reorganizes into that 
country, or a third-party country, if applicable. In the past, inversions 
were regularly completed as “self-inversions,” where the U.S. parent 
company created a foreign parent to merge with, resulting in the original 
U.S. shareholders owning 100% of the surviving foreign corporation.3 
These types of inversions came to a halt in 2004 when the Treasury an-
nounced its first set of inversion regulations.4 Even after those initial 
regulations, inversions continued to exist because intelligent lawyers and 
businesspeople were able to figure out ways to invert while not running 
afoul of those new rules, which they continue to be able to do today even 
after the extra layers of regulations pile on.  
Inversions are primarily entered into to shrink the corporation’s tax 
liability.5 At 35%, the U.S. has the highest corporate tax rate in the de-
veloped world and taxes corporations’ income on a worldwide system, 
meaning that foreign-earned income is also taxed at the 35% rate once 
repatriated (subject to applicable foreign tax credits).6 Currently, U.S. 
corporations have $2 trillion in unrepatriated funds held overseas be-
cause corporations are unwilling to subject themselves to the extra tax 
burden by repatriating them to the U.S.7  
Even though corporations enter into these mergers with the idea of 
minimizing the corporation’s taxes, which enhances shareholder wealth, 
depending on the new country of organization, there may be certain 
changes that could negatively affect the shareholders. In a recent transac-
tion by Mylan, Inc., it inverted to the Netherlands by acquiring Abbot 
Laboratories’ non-US Assets.8 Through this transaction, the corporate 
  
 3. DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43568, 
CORPORATE EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 2–3 (2014),  
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43568.pdf. 
 4. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, sec. 801(a), § 7874, 118 Stat. 
1418, 1562–66 (2004) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7874 (2012)),  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ357/pdf/PLAW-108publ357.pdf.  
 5. Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Inversion Regulations and Proposed Earnings Stripping 
Regulation, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (April 4, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/jl0404.aspx 
 6. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 3, at 3. 
 7. Ben Marlow, Tax Inversions: why Britain’s companies are being pursued by US rivals, 
THE TELEGRAPH (June 21, 2014, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/10916906/Tax-inversions-why-
Britains-companies-are-being-pursued-by-US-rivals.html.  
 8. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Mylan’s Dutch Takeover Defense Is in Nasdaq’s Hands, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/business/dealbook/mylans-dutch-
takeover-defense-is-in-nasdaqs-hands.html. 
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governance policies changed and Mylan was able to implement a “stitch-
ing”9 in order to defend against a hostile takeover, a tactic which would 
be illegal in the U.S.10 This transaction forced the SEC to “solve” the 
problem by issuing an interpretation of Rule 14a-4(a)(3). In addition, the 
Treasury has implemented several new regulations from 2004 to 2016, 
but they have been more focused on reducing the pool of potential for-
eign targets that U.S. corporations may acquire.  
I. SEC UNBUNDLING RULE 14a-4(a)(3) 
Regardless of what the board of directors claims, the principal goal 
of inversion is to lower the corporation’s tax liability.11 When a corpora-
tion wants to invert, the shareholders of the acquiror and the target must 
approve of the merger.12 Due to the strong tax considerations, many 
shareholders overlook the potential negative consequences that may re-
sult from the inversion. This happens because when the shareholders 
vote on the merger as a whole, they focus on the hefty tax savings that is 
likely to increase the value of their stock.13 Unbeknownst to the share-
holders, within these votes there can be hidden items that can potentially 
outweigh the tax benefits. During the previously discussed Mylan inver-
sion, this is exactly what happened, spurring the SEC to amend the vot-
ing requirements of the target corporation.  
During the Mylan transaction, Mylan inverted to have its country of 
organization changed to the Netherlands with the shareholders approving 
the deal as a whole.14 The tax savings for moving to the Netherlands was 
substantial and the board of directors claimed there were other reasons 
for the deal, such as “operational flexibility, improved cash management, 
and an enhanced ability to access international capital markets.”15 When 
it was all completed, the shareholders found out the hard way that the 
inversion might have not been the best decision. This is because three 
months after the inversion, Teva Pharmaceuticals made a tender offer for 
Mylan’s shares, which the Mylan board of directors opposed.16 At this 
point during a hostile takeover, the target may implement defensive tac-
tics to attempt to dissuade the hostile bidder from continuing its attempt-
  
 9. A “stitching” occurs when a Dutch company creates a trust and issues it preferred shares. 
This trust has its own independent board of directors that is supposed to act in the best interest of the 
company. If this independent board of directors sees danger to the company, it can exercise the 
preferred shares and take control of the company, effectively halting the hostile takeover.  
This would be illegal in the United States because it violates the basic rule of directors not being 
allowed to make decision to entrench themselves in office.   
 10. Solomon, supra note 8.  
 11. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 3, at 3.  
 12. Jeffery Bell, Enrico Granata & Isaac Raskin Young, Just in Time for Proxy Season, SEC 
Provides New Guidance on Shareholder Proposal “Unbundling”, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 25, 2014), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dad24c80-d2b0-4485-bf43-0e8cd81d4544. 
 13. Bell, Granata & Raskin, supra note 12.  
 14. Solomon, supra note 8.  
 15. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 3, at 5.  
 16. Solomon, supra note 8. 
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ed takeover. In the United States, there are strict rules for what is allowed 
as a defensive tactic, but the Netherlands subjects its corporations to 
much looser defensive tactic standards.17  
After the inversion, Mylan created a “stitching,” which is used as 
one of the previously discussed defensive tactics. Mylan’s board of di-
rectors had no interest in making “Teva’s problems our own,” even 
though they were offering about a 60% premium over the then trading 
stock price.18 This stitching effectively shielded the company from any 
hostile takeover and is seen as a “just say never” defense.19 In Mylan’s 
case, it issued preferred shares worth up to 50% of Mylan’s shares at a 
price of 1 euro cent per share.20 Therefore, after the inversion, the Mylan 
shareholders had the benefit of the tax savings, but were prevented from 
getting the approximately 60% premium on their shares that Teva of-
fered, because of this stitching.21  
The SEC frowned on this result and believed it was unfair to the 
shareholders because it seemed as though the board of directors was able 
to hide the critical changes to corporate governance within the overall 
merger agreement. As a result, it issued new interpretations of the “un-
bundling” Rule 14a-4(a)(3). The Unbundling Rule 14a-4(a)(3) requires 
that proxy statements “identify clearly and impartially each separate mat-
ter intended to be acted upon” at a stockholder meeting.22 This new in-
terpretation does not change the past guidance with respect to the re-
quired vote by the shareholders of the acquiror because they already 
were required to vote on material changes; it only affects the voting re-
quirements for the target company.23 Therefore, in the Mylan situation, 
the shareholders would have had to vote on the material change to corpo-
rate governance, which may or may not have prevented them from pass-
ing the inversion. But while the shareholders of the target must vote on 
these separate items, their votes are non-binding. Essentially, all the new 
interpretation does is to ensure that the shareholders know what they are 
getting from the overall transaction. The new interpretation simply pro-
  
 17. In the U.S., when there is a hostile takeover, the directors are under an enhanced duty to 
show the decisions are to further the welfare of the corporation and not to entrench themselves in 
office. Then, after good faith and reasonable investigation, the directors must believe there is a 
legitimate threat to corporate policy and effectiveness. The response to the threat then may not be 
coercive or preclusive and the response must be in a range of reasonable responses to the threat 
perceived. A stitching would not meet the standard of a reasonable response but would likely be seen 
as entrenching the directors in office.  
 18. Solomon, supra note 8.  
 19. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Regulators Unbundle Some Attractions of Mergers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/business/dealbook/regulators-unbundle-
some-attractions-of-mergers.html.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Exchange Act Rule 14a-4(a)(3), SEC,  
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/exchange-act-rule-14a-4a3.htm (last updated: Oct. 
27, 2015).  
 23. Id. 
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motes transparency. In addition, the overall merger may be conditioned 
on the shareholders approving of each material change. Therefore, it is 
still possible, if not likely, that the average shareholder prefers the im-
mediate tax savings, and is not concerned with corporate governance, 
approving the merger regardless.  
The new SEC interpretation is not likely to make much of a differ-
ence in deterring corporate inversions, which is the primary reason they 
were put in place. In effect, the new requirement is for the target share-
holders to vote on material changes to the acquiror’s organizational doc-
uments.24 While the shareholder’s vote on these material changes, their 
votes are non-binding to the corporation and the corporation is permitted 
to condition the merger on the approval of each material change.25 In 
reality, the rules only increase the visibility of potential changes, but are 
unlikely to change the overall result of the merger because of the strong 
incentive for current gains from the tax savings.26  
Ultimately, it seems that regardless of the potential future negative 
consequences to shareholders through a drastic change of corporate gov-
ernance, such as the defensive tactic of stitching, it is likely that this rule 
will not slow the inversions because of the immediate tax consequences. 
The majority of shareholders do not understand the complexities around 
the corporate governance rules, nor do they care. They want more money 
and they want it now. This is why this new interpretation, while allowing 
for transparency in the transaction, will not have a material effect on 
future inversion transactions. 
II. TREASURY REGULATIONS 
While the SEC recently took a stand against allowing material 
changes to slide through the merger transaction without the shareholders’ 
knowledge, for years the Treasury department has been issuing regula-
tions to curb the tax benefits of inversion. These treasury regulations are 
intended to ensure that either the U.S. corporation is materially merging 
with a foreign corporation or that the U.S. corporation has a substantial 
business presence in the new country. These regulations have been get-
ting stricter each time they are issued. As of today, five sets of regula-
tions have been implemented: 2004, 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2016.  
These rules have been slowly increasing the restrictions on corpo-
rate inversions. For each of the five sets of regulations, it seems that 
whatever is the “issue of the day” is addressed. Effectively, if the Treas-
  
 24. Abigail Pickering Bomba et al., SEC’s “Unbundling Rule” Interpretation Requires New 
Non-Binding Target Stockholder Vote on Acquiror’s Material Governance Changes in M&A Trans-
action—But Unlikely to Have any Practical Impact, FRIED FRANK: FRIED FRANK M&A BRIEFING 
(2015), http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/FINALv3-11-16-2015-TOC%20Memo-
SECs%20Unbundling%20Rule%20Interpretation%20Requires.pdf. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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ury continues on its current path of issuing sets of regulations every few 
years, it may shut down the inversion market by eliminating viable for-
eign targets. This is not the best solution and would simply put the U.S. 
corporations at a further disadvantage in the global market.  
A. 2004 American Jobs Creation Act  
In the 1990s and early 2000s, corporations were inverting to coun-
tries where there were no business operations, and the original share-
holders would still own 100% of the resulting corporation.27 These were 
known as “naked” inversions because nothing of substance actually took 
place.28 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (2004 Act) effectively 
stopped these types of inversions from happening.29 The 2004 Act stated 
that if the U.S. corporation owned 80% or more of the surviving corpora-
tion, it was disallowed for federal tax purposes and the corporation was 
still treated as a U.S. company.30 It provided a different avenue for a cor-
poration to invert as well if the corporation had 10% or more of its busi-
ness operations in the new country.31  
While the 2004 Act shut down naked inversions, it didn’t shut the 
door on inversion. The 2004 Act paved the way for stricter regulations to 
come.  
B. 2012 Treasury Regulations 
This set of regulations was only aimed at one thing: increasing the 
amount of business operations in the foreign country to 25%, up from 
10% in the 2004 Act.32 The 2012 Treasury Regulations kept the post-
inversion shareholder ownership to no more than 80%.33 Therefore, un-
der this regulation, a U.S. company could invert to a foreign country if 
25% of its business operations were in that country or the surviving enti-
ty was owned by 20% or more of the foreign shareholders.34  
While this strengthened the percentages corporation’s needed in 
terms of business operations and shareholder ownership, it also kept the 
door open for companies to invert. The 2012 Treasury Regulations, like 
the 2004 Act and the later 2014, 2015, and 2016 regulations, simply 
forced the U.S. corporation to search harder for a foreign corporation that 
would meet these standards.  
  
 27. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 3, at 7.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, sec. 801(a), § 7874, 118 Stat. 
1418, 1562–66 (2004) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7874 (2012)), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ357/pdf/PLAW-108publ357.pdf. 
 31. Id. 
 32. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 3, at 7.  
 33. Id. at 10. 
 34. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 3, at 7.  
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C. 2014 Treasury Regulations (Notice 2014-52) 
On September 22, 2014, the Treasury and IRS released Notice 
2014-52 (Notice) in order to make it more difficult for U.S. companies to 
invert and to reduce the tax benefits of corporate inversions.35 The new 
rules promulgated in this Notice only apply to deals closed on or after 
September 22, 2014.36 The primary change contained in the Notice is 
that if the foreign acquiror’s stock is more than 50% passive assets,37 a 
portion of the foreign acquiror’s stock will not be counted when calculat-
ing the 80% test.38 In addition, extraordinary dividends39 paid by the U.S. 
company to reduce its size before the inversion will not be regarded.40 
Prior to this, it was too easy for corporations to manipulate the 80% test 
by stuffing the foreign corporation with passive assets and making large 
dividends pre-inversion to the U.S. shareholders in order to shrink the 
size of the U.S. corporation.  
The Notice will also affect already inverted companies by prevent-
ing inverted companies from accessing deferred foreign income through 
its controlled foreign corporation by way of “hopscotch” loans to the 
U.S. parent.41  
This set of regulations is yet another example of the Treasury trying 
to make it harder on companies to find foreign corporations to invert 
into. The Treasury is simply finding a loophole and trying to close it, and 
by the end the SEC is going to have ten different pieces of duct tape 
holding together a shattered vase.  
D. 2015 Treasury Regulations 
On November 19, 2015, the U.S. Treasury announced new regula-
tions in an attempt to once again provide a targeted approach to a large 
problem. It announced a major setback to using third party countries in 
an inversion transaction which could potentially halt many deals. What 
this is targeting is when a U.S. company merges with a target, but then 
reorganizes the surviving corporation in a third country.42 For example, 
in the Endo Health transaction, the U.S. company, Endo Health, bought a 
Canadian company, Paladin Labs, and relocated the combined organiza-
  
 35. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Passive assets are assets of a business that are not needed at that point in time in order for 
the business to operate.  
 38. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, supra note 23. 
 39. Extraordinary dividends are irregular dividends that are not derived from profits arising 
out of the ordinary course of business.  
 40. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, supra note 23. 
 41. Id. 
 42. I.R.S. Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775; see also Fact Sheet: Additional Treasury 
Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Nov. 19, 2015), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0281.aspx. x 
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tion to Ireland.43 These regulations will largely halt these types of trans-
actions. If a company wants to pursue the inversion transaction, it must 
locate a company in the country of relocation.  
The current law allows inversions as long as the resulting corpora-
tion has 25% or more of its business activity in the foreign country or the 
U.S. parent owns less than 60% of the resulting corporation. If the U.S. 
corporation owns 80% or more of the resulting company, the inversion 
will not be recognized for federal tax purposes, unless the business activ-
ity is met. This regulation impacts the transactions where the U.S. parent 
owns between 60% and 80% of the resulting corporation.  
Specifically, this regulation is intended to limit the ability of U.S. 
companies to combine with foreign entities when the new foreign parent 
is located in a third country. Specifically, it will disregard the stock of 
the foreign parent when determining the 80% rule, making it much more 
difficult to reach the required stock ownership levels.  
Prior to these regulations, U.S. corporations could merge with a 
corporation of a third party country and reorganize in any country it 
chose, as long as it met one of the two tests. This restricts the substantial 
business activities exception by adding that the 25% test is only allowed 
to apply within the country of origin of the foreign company.44 This pro-
hibits cherry picking any foreign corporation and reorganizing in the 
country to meet the 25% test.  
Prior regulations have included an anti-stuffing mechanism that 
prohibits the foreign corporation’s stock attributable to stuffed assets 
from being included in determining the 80% test.45 Prior to that, corpora-
tions could stuff the foreign company with assets pre-merger and make it 
seem larger that it truly was. This regulation clarifies that this rule ap-
plies to any assets acquired with the principal purpose of avoiding the 
80% rule, regardless of whether or not the assets are passive.46 
Lastly, the 2014 regulations aimed to prevent the U.S. company 
from making extraordinary dividends in anticipation of the merger. 
  
 43. Ailish Finnerty & Christopher McLauglin, Inversions to Ireland, WESTLAW: PRACTICAL 









 44. I.R.S. Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775; see also Fact Sheet: Additional Treasury 
Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Nov. 19, 2015), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0281.aspx. x 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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These new regulations restrict that rule by not applying it when a foreign 
corporation acquires a U.S. company in an all-cash or mostly cash acqui-
sition.  
The body of the Press Center Fact Sheet for the November 19, 2015 
regulations even contains the idea that only legislation can decisively 
stop inversions, and this is coming from the Treasury department.47 The 
Treasury knows that the regulations that it puts forth only target specific 
issues and attempt to make it more difficult for U.S. corporations to meet 
the standards in order to invert. All this regulation does is provides lim-
ited situations where inversions will be allowed, so they are effectively 
curbed. It further states that it has been working with Congress for years 
to reform the business tax system in order to make it simpler and more 
pro-growth, providing incentives to encourage companies to remain in 
the U.S.  
E. 2016 Treasury Regulations 
In a much quicker turnaround that the past regulations, the Treasury 
department sent out additional regulations on April 4, 2016 in attempt to 
further curb inversion transactions.48 At first glance, the new regulations 
seem to provide a closer “end-all” to inversions, but in fact seem to be 
targeted at one individual transaction, the Pfizer – Allergan merger.  
These particular regulations, while temporary, are a combination of 
reducing the potential foreign suitors for American corporations as well 
as reducing the benefits of earnings stripping.49  
The regulations curbing the potential suitors prevents foreign corpo-
rations that have engaged in mergers with American companies in the 
last three years from using those acquired companies’ value in compu-
ting its current value.50 This affects whether or not the American compa-
ny will have a small enough stake in the resulting corporation to allow 
the merger. For example, in the Allergan – Pfizer merger, Allergan had 
only been worth $20 billion or less three years ago, while Pfizer was 
worth about $150 billion.51 Had these two companies merged at that 
time, Pfizer’s shareholders would have held more than 80% of the com-
bined company, running afoul of the current laws. Between then and 
now, Allergan merged several times and now has a market capitalization 
  
 47. Id. 
 48. Fact Sheet, supra note 5.  
 49. Earnings stripping allows the U.S. company to deduct more tax than they actually earn in 
the foreign market. This incentivizes the foreign parented firms to load up their U.S. subsidiaries 
with related-party debt. This minimizes U.S. taxes by paying deductible interest to their new foreign 
parent or one of its foreign affiliates in a low-tax country. The new regulations will prevent this by 
treating these related-party debt as stock as opposed to treating it as debt, as has been past practice.  
 50. Fact Sheet, supra note 5.  
 51. Michael J. de law Merced & Leslie Picker, Pfizer and Allergan are Said to End Merger as 
Tax Rules Tighten, N.Y. TIMES (April 5, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/business/dealbook/tax-inversion-obama-treasury.html 
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of about $100 billion. Currently, the Pfizer shareholders would only own 
about 60% of the combined company, permitting the merger. This has 
lead the Pfizer CEO to proclaim that "it really looked like they did a very 
fine job of constructing a rule here—a temporary rule—to stop this deal, 
and obviously it was successful.”52 Considering the hastiness of the regu-
lations and the fact that they are temporary, it is likely he is correct in his 
assumption, regardless of what the Treasury states.53  
While the Pfizer-Allergan merger has been halted based on these 
new regulations, none of the other six large inversion deals that were 
going on at the time of the announcement should be affected.54 There-
fore, while at first glance it may seem that if these regulations affected 
the largest inversion in history it must affect the smaller ones, it seems as 
though it will not.  
F. Effect of the Regulations  
Each of these five sets of regulations have been aimed at fixing an 
immediate problem. Whatever seems to be plaguing the inversion market 
at that given point in time is what each regulation addresses. In addition, 
they are slowly making inversions more restrictive, which if continued, 
may effectively shut down the inversion issue all together, but tighter 
regulations are not the answer. The stronger these regulations become, 
the more of a disadvantage the U.S. corporations will have against the 
worldwide market. These new treasury regulations simply provide more 
assurance that inversion transactions will be curbed, but are still a target-
ed approach for a problem that should be fixed with a complete tax over-
haul.  
The Treasury is simply finding a loophole and trying to close it, and 
in the end that duct-taped vase is going to shatter again.  
III. TAX CODE REFORMATION 
While the several rules and regulations enacted by the Treasury and 
the SEC have curbed inversion deals in the past year, they are not long 
term inversion prevention solutions. The only long-term and correct way 
to fix the current inversion problem is corporate tax reform. The U.S. 
taxes it corporations at 35%, higher than any other developed country.55 
In addition, the U.S. taxes its corporations on a worldwide system, mean-
ing that foreign earned income is taxed by the U.S., whereas most other 
  
 52. Tom DiChristopher & David Faber, Allergan CEO: Merger with Pfizer was Targeted by 
US Government, CNBC (April 6, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/05/pfizer-allergan-will-
mutually-terminate-merger-over-inversion-rule-changes-sources-say.html.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Merced & Pickler, supra note 51.  
 55. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 3, at 2, 12.   
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countries use the territorial system, allowing foreign earned income to 
avoid tax once repatriated.56  
Tax code reformation could take many forms, and is likely not to 
take place for several years. Ideally, the reform would allow U.S. com-
panies to compete on an equal level with foreign companies that pay 
substantially less taxes.57 This could occur through a reduction of the 
current 35% rate, moving to a territorial tax system, or both.  
CONCLUSION 
At the bottom line, the only way to “fix” the inversion “problem” is 
for Congress to completely overhaul the corporate tax code. It’s obvious 
at this point that Congress is very reluctant to pursue this policy change, 
if not at least until after the upcoming presidential election. Therefore, in 
the meantime the Treasury department and the SEC seem to have been 
tasked with the responsibility of curbing inversions until the real policy 
makers can get around to it.  
The issue here is that the Treasury and the SEC aren’t going to 
completely fix the inversion issue through policy interpretations of cor-
porate governance rules and Treasury regulations, when the entire issue 
resides in the realm of tax overhaul. The vast majority of shareholders 
have no idea what corporate governance rules are. They are in the stock 
market to make money, and when they hear tax savings, dollar signs roll 
over their eyes. These shareholders couldn’t care less at the outset if the 
corporation may implement a stitching trust. That, along with their votes 
not being binding, leads to the simple conclusion that the SEC interpreta-
tion in response to the Mylan transaction is just a sham. It won’t materi-
ally affect any future transactions.  
While the SEC interpretation has no chance at curbing inversions, 
the Treasury regulations do by simply reducing the field of potential 
suitors. The issue with these regulations is more along the lines of curb-
ing the transactions in the wrong way. They are just making it harder to 
find a suitor in a foreign country. If you limit the field of viable foreign 
corporations, at some point you will effectively curb the trend. But that’s 
not fixing the problem. Currently, because of how high the United 
States’ corporate tax rate is, an American company could likely find a 
foreign suitor, however hard to perform the merger, that would benefit 
the company’s bottom line. Ultimately, the corporation will determine 
how important it is to save 20–25% on its foreign earned income. Likely, 
the board of directors will place a high emphasis on saving that money. 
So while the SEC and Treasury department will likely continue to im-
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http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444230504577615232602107536. 
340 DENVER LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 93 
plement policy change, until Congress changes the tax code, these 
changes are not likely to materially affect future inversion transactions.  
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